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LEX AMERICANA:  CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND THE 
NUREMBERG DEFENDANTS* 
JONATHAN A. BUSH** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Malinski v. New York1 is an obscure case about coercive interrogation and 
multiple confessions from the era before the due process revolution of the 
1960s.  The prosecution conceded that the lead appellant had been stripped and 
held naked for most of a day, put in fear, and subjected to multiple 
interrogations.  Malinski confessed and later confessed again in writing, and 
the question before the Supreme Court was whether the second confession, 
given a few days after the nude detention, could be used in evidence.  The 
Court reversed Malinski’s conviction, though not his co-defendant’s, reasoning 
that even if the coercive setting did not rise to the level of abuse found in 
Chambers v. Florida,2 it made the first confession involuntary and tainted the 
second.3  With facts typical of the Court’s coercion cases a generation before 
Miranda v. Arizona,4 and with a tame majority opinion by Justice William O. 
Douglas, Malinski would appear to be an unremarkable case.  On one level, 
Malinski’s only unusual feature is Justice Frank Murphy’s pointed criticism of 
the New York prosecutor for his casual anti-Semitism: words from a time 
capsule.5 
If Malinski is remembered at all for its law, it is for the odd concurrence by 
Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasizing the error of “[a] construction which 
gives due process no independent function but makes of it a summary of the 
 
* © Jonathan A. Bush 2001. 
** Fellow, Center for Scholars and Writers, New York Public Library.  The author wishes to 
thank Peter Gay and Dorothy and Lewis Cullman for creating the wonderful scholarly oasis that 
is the Center for Scholars and Writers, and Lisa Lang for everything else. 
 1. 324 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1945). 
 2. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 3. Malinski, 324 U.S. at 410. 
 4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 5. Malinski, 324 U.S. at 433-34 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part). 
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specific provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . .”6  Like a star whose elliptical 
orbit is affected by a nearby black hole, Frankfurter’s argument revolved not 
around anything in Douglas’ bland opinion, but in opposition to a 
memorandum circulated by Justice Hugo Black.  Black may have been 
preparing to use Malinski as the vehicle for his famous argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and especially its due process clause, incorporated all 
constitutional rights found in the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to 
state criminal justice.  Having considered his novel incorporation argument 
almost since arriving on the Court, Black must have felt that the time or 
occasion was not right for the full-dress version of the incorporation argument, 
and he did not write in Malinski, nor two years later when the possibility 
presented itself again in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v Resweber.7  But 
Frankfurter chose to include his reply to Black’s memorandum in the Malinski 
concurrence, thus sharing with the world one side in what otherwise remained 
largely an internal debate. 
Late in the 1946 term, Justice Black went public with incorporation in his 
famous dissent in Adamson v. California.8  At the time, it seemed to convince 
almost no one, certainly not a sufficient number of his Adamson brethren, and 
in general not even his closest allies.9  Soon after, the leading Supreme Court 
historian of the day savaged the historical basis of Black’s position.10  For 
fifteen years Black had only isolated victories to show for his incorporation 
argument,11 and as late as 1959 Frankfurter sought occasion to drive a stake 
 
 6. Id. at 415 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  See also HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX 
FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 156-57 (1960) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s 
Malinski concurrence). 
 7. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).  See MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX 
FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 138 (1984) 
(noting that Justice Black explored the incorporation approach as early as 1939).  See also id. at 
157-58 (discussing Justice Black’s Malinski memorandum); id. at 159-62 (discussing Justice 
Black’s unpublished Francis concurrence); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-75 (1942) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (Black advancing incorporation argument).  But see THOMAS, supra note 6, at 156 
(suggesting Frankfurter was replying in Malinski to innuendos in Douglas’s opinion, rather than 
to Black’s memorandum). 
 8. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 9. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 441 
(1968) (quoting Murphy writing his law clerk: “It is hard for me to agree with all that Hugo 
writes.  He may be right, but I doubt it.”); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 167-69 (discussing 
Murphy’s skepticism). 
 10. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The 
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). 
 11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment and making 
it applicable to the states, but without the federal exclusionary rule). 
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through it.12  Then, in the early 1960s, and especially after Frankfurter’s 
retirement in 1962, the Court began consistently to hold that the Constitution 
incorporated each constitutional protection in the Bill of Rights to apply 
against the states, and to the same extent that it applied against the federal 
government.13  By the end of the Warren Court, almost every clause in the Bill 
of Rights pertaining to the criminal process was deemed incorporated.  Black’s 
victory was complete. 
Like most victories, it came with a dark lining.  For one thing, Justice 
Black had been forced to wait so long—until the second half or the third 
phase14 of the Warren Court, almost the end of his judicial career.  For another, 
many of the incorporation cases were close majorities.15  As a result, not only 
were they controversial, but they were also vulnerable to later retrenchment or 
reversal.  One leading case was immediately bypassed and soon limited to its 
own facts,16 and in the run-up to the best known case of all, Miranda, skillful 
judicial maneuvering was required in order to fend off an alternative proposal 
being prepared under the auspices of the American Law Institute by 
sympathizers of Frankfurter.17  In some instances, Black saw the Court bypass 
incorporation to reach a liberal result that Black felt could not be justified by 
incorporation theory.18  Elsewhere, Black’s incorporation victories came 
burdened with concurrences by Harlan, still resisting the reasoning if not the 
result.19  And right down to the end, even justices and scholars sympathetic to 
the due process revolution denied Black the crown of his victory by insisting 
 
 12. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124-29 (1959); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 170-71 
n.107 (discussing Frankfurter’s continuing desire to bury the total incorporation theory once and 
for all). 
 13. The literature on the Warren Court’s rulings in the area of criminal law and procedure is 
voluminous.  The classic work is FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE 
WARREN COURT’S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970) (originally published as THE SELF-
INFLICTED WOUND).  See also CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 6-36 (1993).  Fresh insights are found in the newest study, LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379-444 (2000). 
 14. The periodization belongs to Russell H. Galloway, Jr., The Third Period of the Warren 
Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980). 
 15. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 16. Bypassed by Miranda, the Escobedo holding was soon minimized into insignificance.  
See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that 
“the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts . . .”); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE 
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 87-88, 162-63 (1980). 
 17. See description in POWE, supra note 13, at 392-94. 
 18. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 559-60 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring, with Douglas, J. 
and Goldberg, J.) (stating that regardless of whether incorporation rationale fits the case, due 
process requires and will be employed to justify reversal of conviction tainted by television 
publicity). 
 19. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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that total incorporation was still wrong and that all the Court was doing was 
selectively incorporating each protection.20 
But these were quibbles.  Incorporation became the dominant rationale in 
criminal procedure, eclipsing the fundamental fairness or independent or free-
standing due process theory that Frankfurter was advancing in Malinski.  So 
thoroughly entrenched had Black’s reasoning become that even when the 
Burger or Rehnquist Courts frequently ruled against constitutional claims in 
criminal procedure, they did so not by reversing Black-inspired incorporations, 
but by finding loopholes, exceptions, high thresholds, low waiver standards, or 
harmless error.  For the moment, whatever its faults as demonstrated by 
history, and however incongruous it seems when harnessed to recent narrow 
constitutional rulings, the rhetorical logic of Black’s incorporation theory that 
the Bill of Rights should apply to state as well as federal settings is simply too 
powerful to undo. 
While the incorporation theory has flourished, its predecessor and rival, the 
independent due process theory, has been unable to shake its present low 
esteem among judges and academic observers.  In part, this is because of its 
resemblance to substantive due process in other, non-criminal contexts—the 
Lochner problem.21  It is also due to memories of the way fundamental fairness 
theory was often used in the 1950s to limit judicial scrutiny of even pretty 
unappetizing state criminal practices—the Irvine problem.22  Not least, 
independent due process has languished because of its particular association 
with Frankfurter himself, whose difficult personality soured relations with 
broadly admired colleagues and who is widely, and not entirely fairly, blamed 
for equivocating on race and civil liberties issues—the Frankfurter problem.  
Whatever the reason, free-standing due process in criminal procedure is a 
theory whose time is widely felt to have come and gone, with few to mourn 
it.23 Perhaps Professor Israel’s essay24 in this issue of the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal will be a first step in the revitalization of the doctrine. 
In the following short essay, I will attempt a modest rehabilitation of the 
incorporation doctrine, and to do so I will rely on a seemingly remote example.  
 
 20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-14, 19-21, 27-28, 39 (1967) (relying on independent due 
process); see also id. at 21 (citing Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Malinski).  For tweaking of 
Black by his allies, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 253-54 (1990).  Black’s 
benign public response to his allies’ selective incorporation doctrine is quoted in GRAHAM, supra 
note 13, at 55-56. 
 21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 22. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
 23. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
2.7(a) (3d ed. 2000) (noting “the Court’s description of free-standing due process as having only 
‘limited operation,’ with fundamental fairness infractions defined ‘very narrowly,’ . . .” though 
disagreeing with the accuracy of the Court’s characterization). 
 24. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Development of Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001). 
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At the same time as Malinski, in the late winter of 1945, another group of 
American lawyers was contemplating how to define a criminal process that 
would also embody basic norms of due process.  In other words, the lawyers 
were attempting to define and implement the same notions that Frankfurter 
spoke of in Malinski.  The setting was again Washington, where plans were 
being drafted for the war crimes trials that would soon be negotiated in London 
and begun in Nuremberg.  The drafters were devising a wholly new legal 
institution, and in doing so they were not bound by the considerations of 
federalism and precedent.  But if they were freed from those constraints, they 
were subject to another, for they knew that whatever trials were held would be 
subject to the closest legal and political scrutiny.  In short, the drafters’ task 
was to devise a court that was practical but manifestly fair, and they were 
writing on essentially a blank slate.  The results of their drafting efforts, along 
with the later interpretative gloss of the judges, are the subject of this essay. 
It is not the aim of this paper to examine systematically the procedural 
issues of the fourteen American-inspired Nuremberg-related trials.  Nor is the 
aim to compare the procedure at the Nuremberg trials with contemporary 
American criminal procedure or with current international war crimes trials in 
The Hague and elsewhere.  Finally, it is not the purpose to assert a causal 
connection between due process at Nuremberg and constitutional 
developments at home in the late 1940s.  Indeed, with a few exceptions,25 it is 
unlikely that there are causal connections, especially in the area of procedural 
fairness. 
The aim here is simpler.  After a brief survey of the Nuremberg and related 
tribunals in Part II, I will present in Part III a discussion of a few significant 
procedural features of the war crimes trials.  The aim is to draw from the 
Nuremberg procedure a few generalizations about the contours of free-standing 
due process in the same period at home, and to suggest that to contemporaries, 
even to allies of Frankfurter, notably United States chief prosecutor Robert H. 
Jackson, free-standing due process was capable of bearing considerably more 
weight than it carried in the emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 
 25. Justice Jackson frequently commented on the deep impact Nuremberg made on him.  
See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE 
EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxxvii (1954) (describing Nuremberg as “the most important, 
enduring, and constructive work of my life”).  Certainly the trial experience had a deep impact on 
Justice Jackson himself, especially in his First Amendment jurisprudence.  See Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 
314 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. 
JACKSON 267-81 (1996) (discussing the impact of the Nuremberg experience on principally 
Jackson’s First Amendment jurisprudence, but explaining that the influence, if any, on other 
judges or on criminal procedure doctrines is harder to identify). 
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II. THE NUREMBERG BACKGROUND 
The trials under consideration here were but fourteen of the thousands of 
trials held after the Second World War for Nazis, Japanese war criminals, and 
local collaborators in both the European and Asian theaters.  The stakes in 
these various post-war trials were often enormous and the wrongs under review 
staggering in scope and horror.  But the legal framework was almost always 
straightforward.  Trials were conducted either by victorious belligerents 
relying on their national military codes, embodying their version of the laws of 
land or naval warfare, or by liberated nations employing treason or other 
criminal statutes or emergency decrees.  Neither military nor liberated-nation 
trials required a new legal framework, and both were amply supported by 
historical precedent and international law.  For its part, the United States held 
its share of military trials under the authority of the Judge Advocate General, 
many on the site of liberated Nazi concentration camp Dachau and others on 
only slightly less notorious Japanese and German facilities.  Overall, 
proceedings were held in dozens of countries, starting immediately after 
liberation, with passions still high, and continuing years after, with elderly 
participants and unhurried process.26  We will never have accurate numbers of 
how many trials were held in all.  We only know that they were based on old 
law of some sort, and so did not require new formulations of due process. 
But for a handful of the highest-level perpetrators, Hitler and Mussolini 
and Goering and Tojo, the legal situation was different.  For one thing, every 
victim nation had been harmed by the perpetrators’ deeds and, it was assumed, 
each nation wanted to be a part of post-war judicial reckoning.  For another 
thing, the familiar tools of national and military law may not have been 
adequate to reach these leaders.  If they were not uniformed personnel (subject 
to the military law of the victorious belligerents), and were not nationals of 
liberated nations or had not personally committed acts in those nations (subject 
to the law, say, of Norway or Poland), and if in the case of the German leaders, 
they had complied with or even formulated, rather than broken, German law 
(that is, if they were senior German officials rather than low-level killers), it 
was difficult to see how familiar tribunals could reach them.  So, as planning 
for post-war settlement gained momentum during the war, the Allies began by 
1942-43 to contemplate special provisions for “the case of the major criminals 
 
 26. Professor Howard Levie collected many of the more important cases in HOWARD S. 
LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES (1993).  A recent collection of studies 
examining the context of trials in a handful of liberated nations is THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION 
IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH (István Deák, Jan T. Gross, & Tony Judt eds., 
2000).  The most complete survey of trials in the Far Eastern theater is PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, 
THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945-1951 (1979).  
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whose offense have no particular location and who will be punished by a joint 
decision of the Governments of the Allies.”27 
The result of this broad distinction was a series of trials of major criminals 
by newly constituted international tribunals: a four-power trial at Nuremberg 
(1945-46) at which twenty-two individuals and six organizations were tried; 
twelve subsequent American trials at Nuremberg (1946-49) trying some 185 
Germans grouped according to type of offense (SS, law, medicine, heavy 
industry, foreign ministry, banking and military high command); a series of 
French trials at Rastatt in French-occupied Saarland (1946-48) trying low and 
mid-level military personnel and a single industrial concern for use of French 
slave labor; and the eleven-power trial at Tokyo (1946-48) trying twenty-five 
senior military and political figures immediately below the emperor.28  All four 
programs have been the subject of considerable academic study, and it is not 
the purpose here to add to that literature.  For present purposes, all that matters 
is the international character of each of these proceedings.  In legal 
contemplation, the three European programs were the result of international 
negotiation and were governed by international instruments.  The first 
Nuremberg, Rastatt and Tokyo trials had an international cast of judges, and all 
four programs had the participation of an international staff of investigators, 
researchers and lawyers, both prosecution and to an extent defense.  When 
various appeals and petitions were taken from the American Nuremberg 
tribunals to federal courts in Washington, those courts were right to recognize 
the international character of the proceedings and reject American review.29 
That said, on another level these trial programs bear the deep impress of 
American participation and American legal norms.  We know a great deal 
about the genesis of these trials.  The eventual picture of Allied post-war 
cooperation grew inauspiciously out of initial British hostility in 1941 to the 
demands of the wartime governments-in-exile for post-war trials, through the 
ineffectual wartime activities in London of the official United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, down to continuing British ministerial reluctance as late 
 
 27. The last paragraph of the so-called Moscow Declaration, Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, Nov. 1, 1943, is cited in such official war crimes series as REPORT OF ROBERT H. 
JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY TRIALS 11-12 (1949) (“Red Series”).  An annotated version is given in THE 
AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944-1945, at 13-14, 221 
(Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982). 
 28. A survey of all four programs is found in LEVIE, supra note 26, at 45-98, 115-16, 141-
55.  For additional information on the two lesser known programs, see TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949) [hereinafter TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT]; YVELINE 
PENDARIES, LES PROCÈS DE RASTATT (1946-1954) (1995). 
 29. Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879 (1949), 
reh’g denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950).  Other summary dismissals are cited in K. Brandt v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) and Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947). 
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as the spring of 1945.30  We know that neither British nor American military 
lawyers offered practical legal help in the difficult problem of handling top-
level civilian perpetrators.  As for the contributions of the other two major 
powers, it is simplistic but not inaccurate to say that the French seem to have 
been content just to be included among the Big Four victorious powers with 
the opportunity to punish offenders against French victims, and the Soviets 
were agreeable to any plan that would lead to the punishment of Nazis.  The 
road to Nuremberg led essentially through Washington. 
Historians have been able to reconstruct an almost day-by-day record of 
the work of these Washington planners.31  The various contributions of Henry 
Stimson, Samuel Rosenman, Francis Biddle, Herbert Wechsler, Ammi Cutter 
and John McCloy are known, and the important innovations of second-tier 
officials like Murray Bernays and William Chanler have been retrieved from 
obscurity.  We know who devised each of the characteristic American features 
of the Nuremberg trials—not only common law procedure, but conspiracy, 
organizational guilt, aggressive war and crimes against humanity, and what 
arguments they used to convince skeptics.  We also know that in almost every 
draft and explanatory memorandum, they included discussion of the elements 
of fairness and due process as necessary elements for American participation in 
a tribunal.32 
In the summer of 1945, after V-E Day and the immediate stabilization of 
Germany, war crimes planning moved to London, where representatives of the 
four major victors gathered from late June to early August to negotiate the 
ground rules and legal charter for what would be the first Nuremberg trial.  
Even more is known about these negotiations, for in addition to the manuscript 
notes of various delegates, we have the published contemporaneous notes 
collected by the personal secretary to Justice Robert H. Jackson, President 
Truman’s plenipotentiary for war crimes issues and chief American delegate at 
the conference.33  The notes show that the major sticking points at the London 
negotiations had to do with the substantive definition of crimes, venue, 
presidency of the judicial panel, and selection of particular defendants.34  Trial 
 
 30. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR 26-33, 40, 45-46 (1992) [hereinafter TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY]; UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1948); ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: 
ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT (1998). 
 31. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 33-42; BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO 
NUREMBERG (1981); Sidney S. Alderman, Negotiating on War Crimes Prosecutions, 1945, in 
NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS 49, 54-56, 79 (Raymond Dennett & Joseph E. Johnson eds., 
1951) (emphasizing the distinctive features of the so-called American plan). 
 32. See TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 45-46. 
 33. See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27. 
 34. Legal issues at the London negotiations included: different definitions of the crime of 
aggressive war, see REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 293-309, 312-17, 327, 
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procedure was particularly important to Jackson, and he repeatedly made clear 
that both American legal standards and public opinion demanded fair trials.35  
But specific procedural points were handled with dispatch.  Occasionally 
uncertainty arose concerning how to harmonize Anglo-American trial 
procedure with the civil law procedure more familiar to the French and 
Soviets, as well as the Germans.  These issues were readily resolved, typically 
along common law lines, and the results embodied in the so-called “London 
Agreement” that created the first Nuremberg tribunal, the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT).36 
The three trial programs that followed the IMT have predictably been the 
subject of less scholarly energy, and in examining their origins we lack the full 
record of published memoranda and minutes corresponding to the London 
material.  But even the organic acts establishing the Tokyo trial (a 
proclamation to the various Far East Allies from the American Supreme 
Commander of the theater, General Douglas MacArthur),37 and the two 
occupation-zone programs at Nuremberg and Rastatt (both authorized by 
Control Council Law No. 10 between the four occupying powers in 
Germany)38 show that the framers of these tribunals recognized the need to 
 
329-37, 359, 363, 373-75, 380-95; the structure on the indictment, id. at 79-80, 153-54, 271; the 
appointment of the judges, id. at 214-15; the presidency of the bench, id. at 73, 233; whether a 
defendant might testify and be cross-examined, id. at 257, 262-64; the autonomy of each nation’s 
prosecution team, id. at 152, 254, 288, 321-22; in absentia defendants, id. at 246; the location of 
the trials and the administrative headquarters of the court, id. at 143, 149, 157, 277-78, 279-81, 
340-41, 365; the blending of civil and common law procedure, id. at 78, 115-16; the treatment of 
witnesses, id. at 282, 403-04; and the rendition of suspects, id. at 145-48, 158-59. 
 35. For example, see Justice Jackson’s remarks the need for or worrying about fairness and 
perceived fairness at the planned trials, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 84, 
102, 150, 158, 266, 284, 336, 389, 408; see TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 49, 53, 
59; Alderman, supra note 31, at 60-79.  For comments to the same effect prior to the London 
Conference, see THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 158-59, 167-71, 190, 
196, 206-07. 
 36. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement, Aug. 
8, 1945 [hereinafter London Agreement], reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra 
note 27, at 420-29 (charter and protocol only); 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 10-18 
[hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS] (“Green Series”).  For text with commentary, see 
LEVIE, supra note 26, at 54-69 (commentary), 549-58 (text of charter and protocol only).  The 
rules of court, adopted 29 October 1945, are published in various war crimes official reports, such 
as 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 18-22. 
 37. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946 
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter], reprinted in 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1218-
23, 1224-27.  Both charter as amended and court rules are also reprinted in LEVIE, supra note 26, 
at 141-55 (commentary), 571-77 (text). 
 38. Control Council Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), officially reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 28, at 6-10 (commentary), 250-53 (text); 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 
supra note 36, at 23-28.  The American implementing legislation, Ordinance No. 7, dated Oct. 
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define the courts, their jurisdiction and fair procedures for the defendants.  
While the French tribunal at Rastatt inevitably adopted French trial procedure, 
the other two international programs, at Tokyo and the second round of trials at 
Nuremberg, were planned along familiarly American lines. 
As for the four trial programs that were ultimately held pursuant to these 
three international agreements, they followed in the direction contemplated by 
the drafters, with a careful focus on procedural fairness.  To be clear, I am not 
arguing that all, most, or any war crimes judicial rulings came out “right” or 
were conformable with American constitutional law of that day or this.  The 
point here is only that the American war crimes planners, prosecutors and 
judges who participated in and for the most part led these programs (aside from 
Rastatt) consistently tried, by their lights, to anchor their activities closely to 
what they understood to be the requirements of an American fair trial.  The 
judges in particular, almost all of them, kept their trials focused on familiar 
issues of fairness and rights at least as much as on larger issues of political 
history and persecution.  In the following discussion, I shall use a small portion 
of the published pre-trial and trial evidence to make a few generalizations 
about what American lawyers thought they ought to do and were obliged to do 
in conducting fair trials abroad, and to ask why it matters. 
III. AMERICAN DUE PROCESS AT THE TRIALS 
A key planning memorandum from January 1945, issued in the name of 
the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General, stated that 
American policy should be that international war crimes trials were to have 
streamlined, simplified procedure that avoided legal niceties.39  As the creation 
of victors in war, any tribunal was itself an act of grace, one that might embody 
as many or few rights as the victors chose to give it.  On a more practical basis, 
the fear was that a court freighted with the due process paraphernalia of 
domestic courts would be ineffectual.  Worse, as British planners worried, a 
proper legal court might result in widespread exonerations and a propaganda 
debacle, much as had occurred with war crimes trials after World War I.40  All 
this seemed obvious, and so the need for a summary court with streamlined, 
 
18, 1946, is reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 286-91, and 15 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 28-35.  Both charter as amended and court rules are reprinted 
in LEVIE, supra note 26, at 558-70. 
 39. Memorandum for the President: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals, January 
22, 1945, in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 3-9; THE AMERICAN ROAD TO 
NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 117-22 (text), 55-56, 238-39 (commentary).  The continuing 
emphasis on speedy, efficient procedure is found in both minutes and subsequent drafts.  See, 
e.g., THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 77, 115, 121, 127-28, 145, 148, 
154, 155, 165, 178; REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 66, 113, 126, 212, 270, 
339. 
 40. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 29. 
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effective procedure was reiterated in negotiations and draft proposals in the 
summer 1945 London conference.  Streamlined procedure was retained in 
softened form in the final version of the London Agreement, and then was 
carried over into both Control Council Law No. 10 and the Tokyo Charter.41  
Not that military trials needed explicit reservation or international agreement 
under American law to authorize the use of summary (sometimes very 
summary) procedure.  The Supreme Court had recently reiterated that only 
minimal standards of due process need be followed in so-called military 
commissions convened even on American soil under the traditional laws of 
war to try certain types of enemy offenders (in the Saboteurs Case).42  It was to 
stand by that ruling again soon after the war in declining to review the flawed 
trial of General Yamashita and dozens of lesser-known military-law trials 
conducted overseas.43 
Yet, having made sure to include in each charter language responding to 
the concern that due process standards might cripple war crimes trials, the 
drafters of each of the three instruments (London Agreement, Tokyo Charter 
and Control Council Law No. 10 with its American Ordinance No. 7) assumed 
and accepted that courts would be staffed by independent judges, applying 
civilian legal standards and ensuring their institutional independence by 
adopting additional, detailed court rules.  Together, the three court charters and 
the subordinate court rules, along with the bench rulings interpreting their 
charters and rules, embody a clear vision of familiar due process for criminal 
trials. 
Under the three trial charters and subordinate rules, the architects of the 
war crimes trials required charging documents that gave defendants fair notice 
and identified the charges with sufficient particularity, even though this latter 
requirement took some compromise prior to the first trial between prosecutors 
from common law and civil law traditions.  They set up courts with 
independent judges; they guaranteed defendants the right to counsel of their 
choice and the opportunity to hear, object to, and rebut evidence against them, 
and to present their own evidence; they permitted the defendants the right 
personally to testify, and the right not to testify; and they gave judges the 
 
 41. London Agreement, supra note 36, Art.18-19; Ordinance No. 7, supra note 38, Art. VI-
VII; Tokyo Charter, supra note 37, Art. 12. 
 42. United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 43. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  See also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) 
(Douglas, J., concurring), 335 U.S. 876 (1948) (Jackson, J., mem.), reh’g denied, 335 U.S. 906 
(1949); Homma v. Peterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946) (other denials to cases from Far Eastern theater, 
both international tribunal and military commission cases).  See supra note 29 (comparable 
holdings for cases from European theater). 
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power to compel evidence, both against and for the defendants.44  Even at the 
most general level, the picture of due process looks both reasonably fair and 
familiar. 
In fact, the new tribunals’ charters gave defendants many rights that went 
beyond anything allowed in the American system, federal or state.  For 
example, defendants in the second round of Nuremberg trials were given the 
right to be present with counsel both at depositions taken of witnesses 
unavailable for trial and, remarkably, also at interrogations of prospective 
prosecution witnesses who were being detained by the Allies (as possible 
defendants in later trials or as protected informants).45  There indeed may be 
tactical advantages for a prosecutor to be able to confront a defendant with 
possible evidence against him and provoke a reaction implicating either the 
defendant or the witness, but the advantage is hardly so great that prosecutors 
want to allow all defendants presence in witness interrogations as of right.  
More likely, a defendant’s presence will allow him to discover the evidence 
against which he has to prepare.  For that reason, no American jurisdiction 
permits anything of the sort as of right. 
Another Nuremberg procedure that went beyond anything allowed at home 
was the defendants’ right to address the court if they wished, freely, not under 
oath, and not subject to cross-examination, at the close of proceedings, in 
addition to the right to give sworn testimony and to have counsel make a 
closing argument.46  These unsworn statements were not wholly unknown to 
the common law, but almost so.  Only Georgia of the then forty-eight 
American states and a handful of other common law jurisdictions permitted 
unsworn statements in 1945, and in the years to come, where the right had not 
lapsed into desuetude, it was abolished save only in a few Australian states.47  
Significantly, where unsworn statements were allowed at common law, the 
right was historically in lieu of the defendant’s right to testify under oath.  At 
Nuremberg, the cobbling together of common law procedure with some 
elements of civil law (which did allow unsworn statements) meant that 
defendants had three separate opportunities to speak to the court: as witness, 
through counsel’s closing argument, and through the unsworn personal closing 
 
 44. See London Agreement, supra note 36, Art. 16; Ordinance No. 7, supra note 38, Art. IV; 
Tokyo Charter, supra note 37, Art. 9.  But see PICCIGALLO, supra note 26, at 14 (stressing British 
as well as American contribution to Tokyo indictment). 
 45. 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 63-64, 66-67.  See TAYLOR, FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 28, at 56 (observing that in late 1947 and early 1948 many defense witnesses 
preferred waiting in the Nuremberg jail to leaving, for their prospects might be either extradition 
to face trial or denazification proceedings). 
 46. [NEW SOUTH WALES] LAW REFORM COMMISSION, UNSWORN STATEMENTS OF 
ACCUSED PERSONS: REPORT NO. 45, at 13, 22, 32 (1985); Alderman, supra note 31, at 49, 67 
(citing Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 28 (1942)). 
 47. Id. 
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statement.  In two trials, a few defendants were even given a fourth opportunity 
when the bench ruled the defendants possessed such unusual expertise that 
they, in addition to their counsel, should be permitted to cross-examine certain 
of the prosecution’s expert witnesses.48 
Other rights not commonly given at home included a remarkably broad 
guarantee of appointed counsel of one’s choice.  At home, the Supreme Court 
had read due process as ensuring counsel to all defendants in capital cases,49 
which the Nuremberg cases also were.  But counsel for indigents, then and 
now, meant court-appointed, usually overworked and underpaid, and in death 
penalty cases sometimes stunningly inept representation.  At Nuremberg, 
defendants (all of whom were indigent, since even formerly wealthy 
industrialists held currency, legal title, shares and so forth from a defunct 
regime whose legal guarantees at least provisionally were worthless) were 
allowed to select counsel of their choice from anywhere in Germany.  
Comparisons with indigent or frozen-asset defendants today are inapt, since 
most lawyers in war-ravaged Germany were indigent too.  The attraction of 
American compensation and canteen privileges, along with sympathy for the 
German lost cause, proved compelling, and few lawyers turned down inquiries 
from Nuremberg defendants.  The accused chose their counsel well, drawing 
from the ranks of the leading practitioners and academic lawyers.  In the 
Tokyo and subsequent Nuremberg trials a defendants chose two and even three 
lawyers each.  Nor was there a political litmus test for defense counsel.  In the 
European theater, most of the defense lawyers had been at least nominal Nazis, 
and some more active than that.  The court secretariat tried not to advertise the 
availability of Nazi lawyers, but turned down no requests on that ground.  The 
only limit placed by the Nuremberg tribunal was, for obvious reasons, on 
lawyers who covered up their past or were themselves possible candidates for 
war crimes trials or denazification proceedings.50  Nuremberg defendants also 
 
 48. 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 342-52.  See also id. at 710 (permitting 
counsel to call another defense lawyer as a witness). 
 49. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 50. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 29-30, 47-49, 86, 87, 297-344 (providing 
numbers, description and treatment of defense lawyers; list of names and resumes); TAYLOR, THE 
ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 627.  For isolated episodes where the Allies denied defendants their 
chosen counsel, see 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 329-36 (refusal to permit 
participation of Earl Carroll, Esq., on Krupp defense team); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING 
JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 157 (1977) (noting that early in the IMT, two groups of senior 
German generals, not charged individually at the IMT but likely members of the organizational 
defendant “General Staff and High Command” secretly petition the court to drop their talented 
court-appointed civilian lawyer and be represented instead by an Army general; motions denied); 
ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 83 (1983) (Doenitz requests British or American 
admiral as defense counsel in event Otto Kranzbuehler unavailable; Rosenberg requests co-
defendant Hans Frank as his defense counsel).  For examples of the German bar’s ambivalence 
toward or rejection of Nuremberg defendants, see id. at 81, 84, 86 n.*; EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE 
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were permitted to waive potential conflicts and select joint counsel; thus, able 
defense lawyers like Dix, Kranzbuehler and Seidl were in demand and handled 
multiple defendants in a single case.51 
A final illustration of due process rights exceeding anything at home was 
defendants’ access to documents.  At home, criminal law was still described by 
the old analogies to a game or a fox-hunt in which each side was left to its own 
resources and enjoyed almost no right to discovery of the other side’s 
evidence.52  The framework for modern federal criminal discovery  
(“Jencks,”53 Brady,54 and modern versions of Rule 1655) was still years in the 
future, and even the early case of Mooney v. Holohan (1935) was viewed more 
as an endgame move in a long-running political cause celebre than as the 
starting point of modern criminal discovery.56  At Nuremberg, defendants were 
permitted, upon motion, to examine documentary evidence in the hands of the 
occupation authorities; in effect, given access to the prosecution’s principal 
source of evidence. 
 
TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 35 (1966).  For the very different arrangements for Japanese and 
American defense counsel at Tokyo, see PICCIGALLO, supra note 26, at 13-14; Solis Horwitz, The 
Tokyo Trial, 28 INT’L CONCILIATION 473, 491-93 (No. 465, Nov. 1950); THE TOKYO WAR 
CRIMES TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 93-94, 104, 119-21 (Chiro Hosoya, Nisuki 
Andō, Yasuaki Ōnuma, Richard H. Minear eds., 1986). 
 51. For example, in the Medical case, Alfred Seidl defended three defendants and Hanns 
Marx and Fritz Sauter each defended two more of the twenty-three defendants.  In six other trials 
(the Justice, Farben, Einsatz, Krupp, List and High Command cases), at least one principal 
defense counsel had two and sometimes three clients.  See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 
28, at 297-344. 
 52. The version of Rule 16 in effect at the time permitted discovery upon motion, if the court 
was satisfied the request was reasonable and the requested item material.  In practice, however, 
this was construed very narrowly, and normally the only items shown to defendant were 
impounded documents taken from him.  See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM 
ARREST TO APPEAL 329-33 (1947). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).  This is the so-called “Jencks Act”; it largely reversed Jencks v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
 54. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
 56. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).  Both Felix Frankfurter (as President 
Wilson’s representative charged with preparing a presidential report on San Francisco bombing 
and Tom Mooney’s trial) and Telford Taylor (as a young lawyer working on one of Mooney’s 
final Supreme Court petitions in the mid-1930s), were familiar with Mooney and the problem of 
willful government use of perjured testimony.  FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 
REMINISCES 130-35 (1960) (Frankfurter’s participation); Telford Taylor, The Reminiscences of 
Telford Taylor 237-38 (1956), (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia University 
Oral History Research Office) (Taylor’s participation).  See, e.g., GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO 
BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 200-01 (1977) (illustrating view of Mooney as about 
federal supervision of state practice more than criminal discovery as such).  The Taylor oral 
history is cited with permission of the Estate of Telford Taylor, whom the author gratefully 
acknowledges. 
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To a defense lawyer, this sounds too good to be true, and it was.  For one, 
there is the familiar difficulty in this area of the law with requiring the defense 
to move for evidence when it does not know what relevant documents the other 
side has located and when a blanket request will not be honored.  For another, 
the Nuremberg prosecution was obliged to comment on defense production 
requests, and the leading student of the matter has concluded that the 
opportunity to comment and object significantly, but not surprisingly, impeded 
defense discovery.57 
The reason for this rule went beyond the usual desire of prosecutors to 
keep an advantage at trial, and lay instead in the unique context of Nuremberg.  
Never before, or since, had a modern bureaucratic state been completely 
defeated such that its official documents, where not destroyed, were captured.  
But captured did not mean catalogued.  The volume of material was simply 
staggering, and historians and archivists were combing, cataloguing and 
inventorying the mountains of captured documents for years afterward.  Teams 
of researchers (some formally part of the prosecution staff, others attached to 
other branches of the occupation authority or the War Department) were 
required just to make sufficient progress in time for trial in identifying the 
items culled for use as evidence.  Often it was only happenstance that trolling 
and sampling methods yielded crucial evidence.  And beyond the captured 
documents, the pretrial process itself also generated tens of thousands of 
additional items, especially witness depositions.  As a result, simplification and 
streamlining were necessarily the practice.  Prosecution staffers summarized 
the documents, summaries that were later admitted into evidence along with 
the underlying document or read to the court when the evidence was 
introduced.  As the staffers worked through the material to produce the 
summaries, they generated in-house lists, cross-indices and other finding aids 
from which defense counsel were able to browse and request discovery of 
documents. 
Then, midway through the trial program, the court modified its rules and 
eliminated the prosecution’s privilege to comment on and block defense 
document requests.58  From this point onward at least, defendants seemed to 
have little trouble obtaining evidence.  Indeed, defense counsel went on (court-
paid) document hunts to Frankfurt, Berlin and elsewhere, and government 
repositories (branch offices of the Nuremberg document center, as well as 
other government agencies) sent material to the Nuremberg defendants from 
 
 57. JOHN MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT: THE USE OF SEIZED DOCUMENTS IN THE 
NUREMBERG PROCEEDINGS  109-11 (1988) (noting impediments to defense discovery during 
second round of Nuremberg trials) [hereinafter MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT]; TAYLOR, 
THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 627 (acknowledging defense lack of access to prosecution’s 
documentary hoard during IMT, and explaining that many of the defense lawyers were long-time 
and recent Nazis whose reliability with the documents was hardly to be assumed). 
 58. MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT, supra note 57, at 111. 
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Berlin, Washington and Frankfurt.  Of course not everything was available, but 
the defendants seem to have located ample evidence, and the court panels were 
not afraid to threaten the prosecution with discovery sanctions for failure to 
comply.  Defendants were able to pull together enough material that in most 
cases, presentation of the defense case took longer than the prosecution case, 
with more documents, witnesses and court days.59  It was a far cry from the 
American plan to have speedy, summary, martial-law-style proceedings 
without the full panoply of due process. 
Not all due process rights were extended to or even contemplated for the 
war crimes trials.  In most cases, the reason was obvious from the context of a 
newly pacified occupation zone, in which hundreds of thousands of culpable 
Germans were not yet distinguishable from their millions of hungry, sullen 
countrymen.  Bail was irrelevant since the charges were capital and the risk of 
flight presumably high.  American limits on search and seizure, to the extent 
that there were meaningful limits at home to state policing at the time, were 
irrelevant to occupied Germany, where the Allies needed to swoop in and seize 
weapons and fugitives, and where there were no neutral magistrates available 
to screen warrants and probable cause affidavits.  There was no right to 
counsel during interrogation or when one was the focus of investigation, both 
steps difficult to square with a hungry, rag-tag defense bar and an occupation 
government that needed to know many things in a hurry.  Jury trials would 
have been laughable, allowing a single “twelfth angry Nazi” juror to acquit 
even the worst perpetrator.  The right to severance, to a trial uncontaminated 
by a co-defendant, was also largely irrelevant, given that the prosecution 
contemplated not an ongoing international or American trial program, but one 
or at most a handful of trials in which all the defendants were well-known, 
high-ranking figures and in which similarly situated defendants would be tried 
together. 
Perhaps most controversial was the unavailability of any right to appeal.  
From the first, Justice Jackson had been adamant that there should be no 
appellate tribunal to which defendants might appeal60 and that this was 
consistent with American due process, under which, then and long after, there 
was also no right to appeal.61  All three Allied delegations agreed: In the 
 
 59. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 88; MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY 
DOCUMENT, supra note 57, at 114-17; 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 393-447 
(offering examples of defense counsel being flown to archive repositories in other cities, large 
quantities of documents being brought to Nuremberg, and court panels threatening sanctions 
against the prosecution, such as threatening to draw adverse inferences about evidence subject to 
discovery but not produced).  See also id. at 909 (stating that defense counsel for General 
Rendulic joined a site-visit to the scene of the alleged crime in Finnmark, northern Norway). 
 60. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 161. 
 61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-22 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (rejecting “the 
easy assumption that it [the right to appeal from a criminal conviction] is fundamental to the 
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context of trials of a tiny number of notorious men who had dominated the 
world stage for a dozen years, the need for appellate review of the quantum of 
evidence seemed unnecessary.  But convicted men were nevertheless given the 
right to seek clemency and pardons, based on review of the evidence against 
them, legal issues and their personal circumstances.  This proved to be far 
more valuable than appellate review.  The clearest example was in the second 
round of Nuremberg trials.  In total, some 142 were convicted, with twenty-six 
sentenced to death, only half of whom were actually executed.  All others, 
whether sentenced to death, life imprisonment or a long term of years, were 
soon released.  The convictions and sentences (except for those in the 
Ministries Case, which was still continuing) were given a supposed final 
review by the American Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, before his 
departure in the spring of 1949.62  Then, in the years that followed, a series of 
civilian supremos, American High Commissioners John J. McCloy, Walter 
Donnelly and James Conant, re-reviewed every conviction.  As early as 1952, 
most convicted men were free, by August 1955, only seven prisoners 
remained, and in 1958, the last prisoner was released.63  Needless to say, the 
American clemency programs, and their counterpart in the British Zone, were 
widely seen as political: motivated by West German pressure and Cold War 
exigency.64  A Nuremberg critic might still insist that the defendants’ good 
fortune was not the same as having enjoyed a legal right to appellate review.  
Perhaps so, but one would be hard-pressed to show that any defendant would 
have done better before an appellate tribunal than he did by relying on the 
mercies of subsequent High Commissioners and their clemency boards. 
Let me conclude this quick tour d’horizon by mentioning three instances of 
due process in the war crimes programs: one indispensable, the second 
shocking, and the third essentially eviscerating the entire program.  The first 
was the burden of proof at Nuremberg.  Probably the cornerstone of all other 
due process rights is the presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Nowhere in Nuremberg planning documents was there 
 
protection of life and liberty and therefore a necessary ingredient of due process of law,” stressing 
“the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether” and explaining the Court’s holding 
as requiring only that if a state creates appellate avenues, it must do so consistent with the due 
process and equal protection clauses). 
 62. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 96. 
 63. See THOMAS ALAN SCHWARTZ, AMERICA’S GERMANY: JOHN J. MCCLOY AND THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 159-75 (1991); PETER H. MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN 
AMERICAN STORY 205-82 (2001); FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL 
PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955, at 54-153 (1989).  One of the arguments advanced in 
support of pardons and clemency was that Nuremberg was not a civil/common law hybrid, as 
Taylor had insisted, but essentially an American court, to which American standards of 
comparable, individualized, and merciful sentencing should apply.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 
354 n.2 (quoting McCloy as describing the trials as “justice American style”). 
 64. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, The Nazis Go Free, THE NATION, Feb. 24, 1951, at 170-72. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
532 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:515 
any reference to burdens of proof, and there was no self-evident reason why a 
rigorous burden of proof should be adopted—after all, it was not only the 
Soviet delegates that kept asking whether the entire world did not know 
enough already of the guilt of men like Hermann Goering.  Yet in the end, in 
both the first Nuremberg and later trials, defendants against whom damning 
evidence was introduced were acquitted of some or even all charges.  Some 
defendants were acquitted despite adverse findings of fact because the court 
felt there was legal impediment: Schacht because of lack of specific intent that 
he made possible Hitler’s illegal rearmament for actual use in war; Doenitz 
because of alleged ambiguity in the law of submarine warfare as understood by 
the British Navy and the American Pacific Fleet; General Rendulic because of 
his alleged perception of military exigency as he laid waste to northern 
Norway in the winter of 1944-45; Generals Foertsch and Geitner because on a 
flow-chart they were senior staff rather than line commanders when they 
knowingly disseminated direct orders for Balkan atrocities.65  In each case, the 
acquittals were in the teeth of strong evidence and of Allied pressure to 
convict.  But other defendants were acquitted solely and explicitly on burden 
of proof grounds, with the court sometimes conceding the likelihood that a 
defendant was guilty as charged.  Thus, medical officials Ruff, Romberg, and 
Weltz, and I.G. Farben defendants Lautenschlager, Mann, and Hoerlein were 
fully acquitted of medical atrocities, and Milch acquitted of the medical 
charges (but not of slave labor) solely because of the prosecution’s alleged 
failure to meet its Anglo-American burden of proof, even though the court 
charters did not require that level of proof.66 
The second example of due process was the opening bombshell at the IMT 
involving the indefinite postponement of one defendant’s case, even though 
there was no textual requirement to do so.  It had always been the Allied plan 
to charge a representative defendant from German armaments and heavy 
industry for illegally arming Hitler and enthusiastically participating in the 
 
 65. United States v. Goering (1946), published in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: 
OPINION AND JUDGMENT 134-37 (Schacht acquittal); id. at 138-40 (Doenitz decision); id. at 156 
(Speer acquittal of aggressive war) (1947) (“Red Series”); United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 757, 1281-88 (Foertsch and Geitner); id. at 1295-97 
(Rendulic) (1948) (“Hostage Case”); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 592-94 
(evaluating Doenitz decision). 
 66. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 65, at 137 (Schacht 
acquittal based on possibility of reasonable doubt); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 
592 (Schacht); United States v. Brandt, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 272-77 
(1947) (Ruff, Romberg and Weltz); United States v. Milch, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra 
note 36, at 773-79 (1947); United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, 
at 1168-72, 1195 (1948) (the “Farben Case”) (acquittal of the three Farben officials of medical 
atrocities and other charges); Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International 
Law, 27 INT’L CONCILIATION 241 (No. 450, Apr. 1949), reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 28, at 165-66, 212. 
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“aryanization” of German Jewish property in the 1930s and spoliation and 
massive use of slave labor across Europe in the 1940s.67  Eventually the Allies 
decided to charge, at least in this first trial, Gustav Krupp, chief of the 
notorious Krupp firm until he stepped aside in favor of his son in 1941.  On the 
eve of trial, it was learned that the elderly Krupp was in poor health and 
mentally incompetent.  There was no provision in the London Agreement or 
the IMT rules for handling of incompetent defendants, and there was strong 
Allied pressure to try Herr Krupp anyway; after all, he would be represented 
by counsel, and an evidentiary record could be established.  The court would 
hear nothing of it.  It severed Krupp’s case and brusquely rejected various 
prosecution pleas to substitute Krupp’s son, who had managed the company at 
the time when it sought out and relied on slave labor.  Traditional common 
(and civil) law rules about incompetent defendants were found to apply, just as 
they did at home.68  In doing so, the Tribunal gave hope to the other 
Nuremberg defendants that it really intended to be fair.69 
The final example was one that, in a real sense, sacrificed the entire 
American plan for Nuremberg in favor of due process.  Briefly, a key feature, 
to some planners the crucial feature, of the American plan was that the first 
proceedings should try not only a few individual defendants, but also culpable 
Nazi organizations such as the Gestapo, and through that address the problem 
of the hundreds of thousands of other culpable Germans.  The plan was that 
those organizations would have counsel, the presumption of innocence, the 
right to introduce and challenge evidence, and all other rights of individual 
defendants.  But once found guilty as entities, their members could 
subsequently be tried by use of familiar American legal tools like criminal 
conspiracy and membership in a criminal organization.  It was expected that 
these later trials would be quick and summary affairs, in which the historical 
case was already made and where the only question was whether a defendant 
had been a knowing member or party to a criminal conspiracy.70  But when it 
came time for the judges to deliberate this American feature of the trial, the 
American chief judge, former Attorney General Francis Biddle, and his legal 
 
 67. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 91-94, 151-59. 
 68. Standard doctrine of the day was summed up by Sheldon Glueck, also a key behind-the-
scenes architect of the first Nuremberg trial.  See, e.g., SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A STUDY IN MEDICO-SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE  47-86 (1925); 
LIVINGSTON HALL & SHELDON GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 318 
(1951). 
 69. ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 140 (1983). 
 70. Control Council Law No. 10 allowed the possibility of charging defendants in 
subsequent international trials such as the American Nuremberg or the French Rastatt 
proceedings with membership in an organization declared criminal in the first Nuremberg trial.  
Art. II, § 1(d), cited in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 250, and discussed in TAYLOR, 
THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 36. 
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aides, chiefly former Assistant Attorney General and Professor Herbert 
Wechsler, would have nothing of it.  They rightly foresaw the dangers to due 
process of group guilt and convictions based on passive membership rather 
than acts. 
The result was that count one (conspiracy), the heart of the American 
presentation and the part of the case chief prosecutor Jackson had reserved for 
himself, was more or less collapsed into insignificance at the first Nuremberg 
trial.71  Conspiracy was interpreted narrowly, and additional elements of 
specific intent were read into both the conspiracy and aggressive war charges, 
leading to the acquittal of defendant Schacht and in the later trials to the 
acquittal of Alfried Krupp (the son) and the board and senior management of 
both his firm and I.G. Farben on charges of aggressive war-making.72  Overall, 
only eight defendants were convicted of conspiracy in either the first or second 
Nuremberg trial program, though many more had been charged.73 
As for the six organizational defendants, the groups whose members were 
supposed to be amenable to summary disposition afterward, some were 
acquitted, and for the others it was held that participation or membership had 
to be not only knowing and willing but active.74  The prospect of later trials of 
members of criminal organizations, even the three organizations convicted at 
the IMT, thus came to nothing.  Aside from uniformed senior officials in the 
three SS trials at Nuremberg, only a few defendants in the later Nuremberg 
trials were convicted for membership at high levels of the SS.  In all but three 
of even these few cases, membership was an additional charge to grave crimes 
against humanity, and the additional sentences were trivial.75  There were no 
 
 71. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 67, at 56; SMITH, 
supra note 50, at 121-22, 134-37.  For criticisms of conspiracy liability from the Tokyo Tribunal, 
see the views of Webb (President, concurring) and Bernard (J., dissenting), cited in PICCIGALLO, 
supra note 26, at 28-29; Horwitz, supra note 50, at 554. 
 72. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 65, at 136 (1946) 
(Schacht judgment); United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 
1211-1306 (Hebert, J., concurring in part); United States v. Krupp, 9 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 396-98 (1948); Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 28, at 191-92 (consequences of Schacht acquittal). 
 73. Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 226-29. 
 74. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 555-58, 587; SMITH, supra note 50, at 116, 
161-65. 
 75. United States v. Brandt, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 248-63 
(conviction of Poppendick and Sievers for SS membership; Sievers also convicted of capital 
crimes against humanity); United States v. Flick, 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 
1223 (1948) (conviction of Steinbrinck on membership and other charges, petty sentence); United 
States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1196-1204 (acquittal of three 
defendants Schneider, Buetefisch, and von der Heyde of SS membership); United States v. 
Alstoetter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1171-79, 1201 (1947) (the “Justice 
Case”) (membership conviction only of defendant Alstoetter; five years); Taylor, Nuremberg 
Trials, in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 165, 174-85, 187, 189 n.170, 196 n.187.  
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separate membership trials, summary or not, for the hundreds of thousands of 
active, knowing, willing members whom Jackson or his successor General 
Telford Taylor had mentioned as potential defendants.  It was a triumph for 
due process.  Indeed, it was a measure of due process we were unwilling to 
apply at home a few years later,76 and it came at the cost of any significant 
criminal trial program for hundreds of thousands of Nazi participants. 
 
Senior SS personnel in another SS case who were acquitted of other charges and convicted of 
high-level active membership were sentenced merely to time served.  See United States v. 
Greifelt, 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 157, 158, 164, 165, 166-67 (1948) (five 
defendants in the SS-race or “RuSHA Case”); United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 36, at 865-66 (1949) (the “Ministries Case”) (defendant Bohle 
sentenced to five years, but only one more to serve).  In one other SS case, one defendant, Ruehl, 
was given a significant sentence for membership, while another, Graf, was sentenced only to time 
served.  United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 581, 587, 
589 (1948) (the “Einsatzgruppen Case”); Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, 
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CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1018, 1061-62 (1947) (acquittal of Scheide and Klein); United 
States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 857 (acquittal of 
von Weizsaecker and Woermann despite their membership).  Thus, only three defendants, 
Poppendick, Alstoetter and Ruehl, were punished according to Bernays’ original plan of using 
membership to facilitate punishment of senior leaders of the worst groups against whom 
individual atrocities could not be shown, and only after exhaustive rather than summary proof.  
TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 36. 
 76. See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 112; TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, 
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Nuremberg alternate judge, Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker.  When Scales sought Supreme 
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his way to Nuremberg judge Francis Biddle, by then retired from practice, who referred Scales to 
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before the Nuremberg tribunal.  See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Telford Taylor, 
Foreword to JUNIUS SCALES AND RICHARD NICKSON, CAUSE AT HEART: A FORMER 
COMMUNIST REMEMBERS 290-94 (1987); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 558; Mark 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
536 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:515 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing sketch, one might infer either that the international war 
crimes trials were perfectly fair or that the author believes they were.  Neither 
of course is the case.  Justice Jackson attempted to push the bounds of fair 
notice when he sought to substitute Krupp junior as a defendant for Krupp 
senior, and similar errors of law or judgment could be shown in almost every 
trial.  Some of these excesses the tribunals saw and rebuffed, others they did 
not, and a few they initiated.  Lines of defense were denied and proposed 
witnesses rejected.  The selection of defendants was sometimes haphazard and, 
in the end, a few defendants who probably should have been acquitted were 
found guilty.77  For them, it was no consolation that the courts had erred for 
others so far on the side of leniency. 
German observers criticized the trials freely at the time, often writing in 
the German-language Swiss press.  They denounced almost every aspect of the 
trials, from the unfamiliarity of the common law procedure to the novelty of 
the substantive charges and the tribunal itself, Soviet participation, the Soviet 
allegations about the Katyn Forest massacre, the participation as judges and 
chief prosecutors of men who had been London delegates establishing the 
court, and Allied refusal to use German courts or judges.78  Japanese critics 
pointed to many of the same faults, and added their outrage at perceived 
American criminality for use of nuclear weapons.79  More recently, criticism of 
Nuremberg was reawakened in the past decade by proponents of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and of the 
possible permanent international criminal court.  These recent proponents 
seemed to have a distinct rhetorical strategy for handling the Nuremberg trials.  
On one hand, they held the fact of Nuremberg to be a good thing, proving that 
international trials are effective and can be conducted with basic fairness.  On 
the other, in the early 1990s proponents enthusiastically catalogued the alleged 
deficiencies of Nuremberg, in those long years before there was a Hague 
tribunal and then when there were no defendants and no trials.  The implication 
was almost of competition, that a new team would break the record of the old.  
Legal study groups were convened and reports issued criticizing such 
Nuremberg features as the death penalty, in absentia proceedings (against 
Martin Bormann), the lack of explicit attention to gender crimes, and the lack 
of neutral judges—as if there were neutral nations at the end of a world war 
 
 77. See, e.g., TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 153-59 (Jackson’s overreaching 
with Krupp); id. at 562 (Streicher overconvicted); id. at 631 (haphazard process for selection of 
defendants). 
 78. A translated sample of this literature can be found in NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF 
THE WAR TRIALS (Wilbourn E. Benton & Georg Grimm eds., 1955). 
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aside from Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, hardly models of arm’s length 
neutrality. 
Much of the criticism, then and now, is mistaken.  A real-world criminal 
lawyer might dismiss it by saying that a court that acquits defendants because 
it feels the law compels that result, defendants against whom the evidence is 
strong and whose conviction both political leaders and the public strongly 
want, must know a bit about the rule of law.  Either way, the effort to evaluate 
previous tribunals and give them passing or failing grades is formalistic and 
misplaced.  The more interesting question is to ask of contemporaries 
according to their own stated standards why they made the choices they did.  
This essay has tried to suggest that the largely American architects of the 
Nuremberg and related international tribunals aimed at holding basically fair 
trials.  Rather than grade their performance or hand out gold stars or demerits, I 
close by asking why these American lawyers held themselves to so much 
higher a legal standard when overseas in Germany than they did at home.  At 
home, there was no suggestion that due process or basic fairness meant 
securing the best counsel from the private bar or outside experts for indigents 
or that defense counsel should observe prosecution witness interviews or have 
broad access to documents.  Why such efforts abroad, at a time when federal 
courts at home took only infrequent steps to ensure the fairness of state 
investigatory and trial practices? 
At first glance, the answer seems easy.  The whole world was watching the 
war crimes trials, especially at the beginning, as the Allies knew.  Publicity and 
self-consciousness are wonderful spurs to reform.  Right around this time, 
many Americans began to realize that the world was also watching domestic 
police practices, particularly against African-Americans in the Deep South.  
But the heat from that spotlight never stayed too long, and was felt only after 
particular lynchings or show trials.  Otherwise, Southern policing was part of 
the larger American dilemma about race, and it was a long time before change 
came. 
For similar reasons, public attention can never be the whole answer for the 
conduct of the war crimes trials, for they too were never in the spotlight for 
that long.  Trials could never compete with glitzier entertainment fare, and 
even the serious public was probably more interested in what had brought the 
world to ruin, what the Nazis did, rather than in what the Allies were saying 
about it after the war was over.  Rebecca West surely overstated matters in her 
famous description of the extravagant boredom at Nuremberg in the spring of 
1946,80 but few trials can stay in the public eye for long, especially complex 
trials built on documents.  Today’s international criminal tribunal in The 
Hague learned this years ago when Court TV stopped its gavel-to-gavel 
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coverage after the first few months of the first trial.  In its day, the IMT was 
among the longest criminal trials in either British or American legal history, 
and the Ministries Case (last of the second round of Nuremberg trials) and the 
Tokyo trial were each longer still.  With proof in all three cases based on the 
introduction of tens of thousands of documents, none was likely to stay in the 
public eye after the first few weeks, and they did not. 
So beyond the real need to meet the standards of the American public, the 
legal community, the victim peoples of Europe, and the wary Germans, there 
were likely other reasons that the participants of Nuremberg were willing to 
work with the discipline of a due process regime.  For one thing, they could 
afford to do so.  The Nuremberg programs had resources—fiscal, physical and 
political—while ordinary criminal processes at home were chronically 
underfunded.  Funds were not unlimited, and every account of the British 
delegation at the IMT and Taylor’s subsequent Nuremberg trials shows that 
funds were watched carefully and measured slowly.  But there were sufficient 
funds for lawyers, mimeograph facilities and plane flights to interview 
witnesses, enough for the defense as well as the prosecution. 
Additionally, trials of the worst of the vanquished enemy brought out the 
idealism in many Nuremberg participants.  Even after the joy of VE-Day had 
faded, after the chill of the Cold War was in the air and the news from home 
was of unheroic things like inflation and strikes, in Germany the few who 
stayed on were doing important work, or so it still felt to many.  Like other 
aspects of the American occupation, trials were felt to be part of an American 
trusteeship, to be discharged properly, and an historic opportunity, the conduct 
of which would be watched and judged.  Crime control at home, by contrast, 
was not an historic opportunity but hard inevitability, offering little outlet for 
idealism. 
Back at home, a Supreme Court frustrated by the intractability of both 
crime and police abuse could comfort itself with the knowledge that the federal 
structure seemed to preclude systematic federal oversight of state policing and 
trials.  In fact, this respect for or distance from state practice was built into the 
notion of constitutional due process.  Jurists applying due process tests that 
relied on the fundamental elements in the Anglo-American tradition saw that 
the need for productive interrogation—not coerced, but certainly interrogation 
not cluttered up or impeded by the presence of counsel—was part of the 
American tradition of policing as well.81  In defining due process for the war 
crimes trials, Justice Jackson and his staff and successors were writing on a 
blank slate and could afford a due process that was more capacious, better 
funded, and less limited by federalism, lax precedent, and the ongoing needs of 
street policing. 
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Not least, there was also class bias in the allocation of due process.  The 
German defendants were not lowly ethnic street hoodlums like Malinski or his 
co-defendant Rudish, but figures from the world stage.  It is difficult to 
imagine “third-degree” or prolonged nude interrogation being applied to such 
olympian figures as Friedrich Flick and Alfried Krupp, the captains of German 
industry and recently among the wealthiest men in Europe; to Field Marshals 
von List or von Leeb, perceived legatees of the feared Prussian military 
tradition; or to proud, educated, articulate mandarins like Hjalmar Schacht or 
Ernst von Weizsaecker.  Doubtless there were instances of abuse, especially in 
the first weeks after the defendants’ capture.82  But many Allied participants 
felt awe as well as contempt for the defendants.83 
Last, the extension of full due process rights to the defendants may have 
appeared to the Nuremberg tribunals to offer a win-win situation, especially for 
those panels that increasingly adopted a sympathetic view of the imposing 
defendants from the higher reaches of German finance, industry, the military 
and the diplomatic corps.  After all, against the most repulsive killers, like SS 
leader Kaltenbrunner and the Einsatzgruppen leaders, there was ample 
documentary evidence, and no amount of lawyering could help them.  As for 
the elite defendants, their top-flight lawyers would show the court that their 
clients were not as guilty as it seemed, clarifying this bit of momentary 
misunderstanding, as it were, as with Schacht.  Failing that, counsel would at 
least explain to the court some of the allegedly important context that mitigated 
their clients’ guilt and showed them to have responded with as much humanity 
as one could expect under difficult circumstances, as with Flick, Albert Speer 
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and others.  Either way, the perception was that with defendants who were 
either so guilty or caught in a difficult spot, and with the truth seemingly there 
in objective documents, there was no cost to a generous understanding of due 
process rights. 
Whatever the mix of motives and reasons, the incongruous result was that 
free-standing due process was understood more broadly and applied more 
generously in occupation Germany than at home in precisely those years 
between the Supreme Court’s first steady interest in state police and trial 
practices and the sudden onrush twenty years later of the due process 
revolution.  Due process is a phrase, a mere formula, and taken out of the 
constraints of the Twining84-Palko85 and federalist tradition, it could be potent 
indeed.  It is unlikely that Rudish, the Jewish co-defendant of Malinski whose 
conviction was sustained, appreciated the irony of our broad understanding of 
extraterritorial due process, any more than Admiral Dewey Adamson may have 
been interested to know that his case had prompted Justice Black’s celebrated 
dissent. 
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